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ABSTRACT

The conditions that intensify conflict avoidance by the central administration in making strategic decisions, and the consequences of such avoidance for the management of college affairs, are discussed. The implication of an emerging decision-making style for adapting the organization to changing environments is also considered. Some of the conditions intensifying conflict avoidance are the problems of authority embedded in the history of an organization, in the nature of search processes, in characteristics of administrative careers, and in the problems that attend selective centralization of decision-making. It is suggested that many of the issues facing universities require new approaches. Such changes cannot be achieved without hierarchical support of strategic objectives, coordination of programs involving more than one department, and unambiguous delegation of authority, as well as flexible criteria for resource allocation. Overly cautious management centralizes selectively and delegates ambivalently. The positive functions of conflict should receive more emphasis, and experimentation and risk-taking should be encouraged. (SW)

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CONFLICT AVOIDANCE AND UNIVERSITY MANAGEMENT

INTRODUCTION

The objective of avoiding conflict is an integral part of the ethos of modern management. Formal managerial theory has defined conflict as a failure of leadership, a failure of communication, or a failure of control (Perrow, 1978:154-160). Within the framework of rational management, conflict implies undesirable costs and few advantages. Such principles of management find expression in practice (Urban: 1982), and they affect how managerial work is appraised.

In the absence of comparative studies, one can only speculate that concerns with the consequences of decisions vary with organizational context and with managers' perceptions of their organization. Prevailing descriptions of specific organizations can influence such perceptions. Thus, when descriptions accentuate potentially "irrational" responses to the exercise of hierarchical authority and magnify the problems of managers in

controlling organizational affairs, concerns with the consequences of decision-making are bound to become more pronounced.

Today's university managers enter their role in a context that furthers very restrictive images of their authority and of their capacity for controlling the development of the core of academic work. Descriptions of the complex, problematic, often inefficient nature of university administration and governance are more numerous than studies that focus on the conditions that facilitate the orderly "processing" of thousands of students; that allow, often in the midst of marked instabilities, the uninterrupted flow of old and new courses, of publications and consultancies; and that permit cooperation among groups with often sharply differing ideologies. The literature emphasizes the limits on administrative authority as expressed in the roles of the managerial mediator and persuader (Clark, 1963). Research stresses ambiguity of purpose, power and success in contexts that deny the significance of goals (Cohen and March, 1974:197). It links loss of mission, financial stringency, and polarization of constituencies to crisis management and to diminished capacities to lead (Millett, 1978), and notes the propensity of some university managers to subordinate missions and values to whatever opportunities arise (Chaffee, 1983). In the context of presumably pervasive ambiguities of purpose, studies encourage cautious and unobtrusive management (Cohen and March,

1974:226-229; Padgett, 1980). Not surprisingly, Baldridge (1971:165) reports that administrators of universities attempt to maneuver in "zones of indifference" and that they precede decision-making with "trial balloon" tactics to judge potential responses.

In universities, as in other professional organizations, cautious decision-making is bound to be unequally distributed. Both the desire to avoid conflicts and the attempt to resolve them peacefully vary with the relationships of parties in an organization (Kahn et.al., 1964). The objective of avoiding controversial decisions thus can be expected to be most pronounced in the academic sector where a host of conditions intensifies managers' dependence on sound relationships with members of the faculty. In this context, the objective of avoiding decisions that create conflict is bound to be grounded in complex images. The processes that are likely to concern university managers have been described (and they are frequently cited) as examples of a particular mode of organizational decision-making: a fluid participatory system that is not readily controlled; sensitive, often negative, attitudes toward hierarchical authority (Blau, 1973:165); governance processes that can become time-consuming "garbage cans;" and complex political processes that usher in unproductive decisions or that fail to provide resolutions (Cohen and March, 1974:19); and lack of consensus over goals and technology that, for the most part,

remains hidden, but that can flare up readily when controversial change objectives are proposed. The impulse to avoid conflict thus refers to processes that are difficult to control, that promise uncertain outcomes, and that can come to symbolize managerial impotence. Armed with such concerns, administrators may prefer to forego important objectives in favor of decisions that can be achieved with less cumbersome processes of decision-making. From an administrative point of view it is more realistic to focus on cumulative small achievements; it is safer to focus on objectives that can be achieved without extending controversial controls over the participatory process, controls that threaten conflict over issues of power and authority between faculty and administrators. Such responses are more likely when administrative objectives imply changes in established practices - for example, changes that affect the power of departments in controlling the content, timing, or organization of the curriculum; changes in the traditional priorities of reward systems; changes in the delivery system that affect faculty control over the time and place of teaching, or controls over governance processes that limit the freedom of committees to define problems or to select the least controversial alternatives.

The subsequent discussion focuses on two areas: 1. The conditions that intensify the propensity of central administration to avoid the articulation of controversial

strategic decisions, and the consequences of such avoidance for the management of college affairs. 2. The implication of an emerging structure of decision-making for adapting the organization to changing environments. The paper is based on informal observation; it uses available literature selectively. The propositions are tentative; they are primarily designed to encourage comparative research in an area that deserves more attention than it has received.

CONDITIONS INTENSIFYING CONFLICT AVOIDANCE

Studies of universities justify the assumption that cautious and subtle uses of hierarchical authority are important norms for decision-making. Enough is known about variations in the exercise of administrative authority, however, to suggest that tendencies to avoid politically cumbersome and conflict-prone decisions vary among organizations. In some universities, the propensity to exercise caution in decision-making shapes specific tactics without affecting the determined pursuit of major strategic objectives. In others, the areas of caution broaden and affect the scope and nature of the objectives that become part of the administrative agenda. The conditions that contribute to such tendencies are complex. Some of them must be

found external to a university - for example, in how authority is exercised by boards, regents, or legislators. Others must be sought in characteristics of the organization, in particular those that affect the more or less secure exercise of hierarchical authority. For the purpose of this paper I am stressing the problems of authority embedded in the history of an organization, in the nature of search processes, in characteristics of administrative careers, and in the problems that attend selective centralization of decision-making.

In settings that encourage particular caution in the management of academic affairs, administrators are more likely to favor a style of management that has been identified as appropriate to stable organizations. Stability is maintained under carefully designed and rationally defended controls, meticulous approaches to accounting and cost-effective management, adherence to traditional procedures, cautious innovation , and slow-moving problem-solving (Caplow, 1976:180-182). Organizations with turbulent histories encourage this approach to management. In universities, such turbulance can have many origins: a period of abrupt retrenchment, unionization, system-wide reorganizations, internal factional conflicts, for example.

Periods of crises intensify the desire of both administrators and faculty for a period of peace. Both parties opt for the sense of stability that is rooted in the pursuit of traditional objectives, in adherence to customary practices, and in a

relatively stable distribution of power and privilege. Both sides feel inclined to avoid issues that create resistance and factional disputes; both sides are willing to "table" the pursuit of complex problems in favor of minimally disruptive issues. The disposition of managers to avoid decisions that are bound to create conflict is supported by the argument that a period of stability is necessary after a period of upheavals, and the argument is sustained by faculty hesitant to confront issues that are bound to create tensions, not only among faculty and administrators, but among colleagues as well. Thus, organizational stability gains priority over the need for change - however clearly perceived by some . The objective of sustaining stability and, therefore, of avoiding conflict-prone issues becomes an important element in defining the organizational agenda. Yet management for stability may also sustain a fiction. The organization is peaceful, but the issues that plague it remain hidden in its stable arrangement.

The history of an organization also affects the security with which managerial authority can be exercised. In contexts that contribute to poorly defined authority or to considerable distrust of managerial power, the objective of managing a stable organization is an important defensive strategy.

Where predecessors had the opportunity to consolidate power and to institutionalize managerial rights and responsibilities, "tough" decisions can be made with less reluctance. Zones of

indifference are of less concern, or they are less narrowly defined; political processes are less threatening because authority confronts opposition less reluctantly. Organizations with frequent successions, on the other hand, confront administrators with uncertain legitimation and with confusing evidence of faculty expectations of their rights in decision-making. In such contexts the typical dilemmas of leadership are intensified (Blau, 1964:203). The exercise of hierarchical authority in controversial areas threatens to undermine further already uncertain legitimacy. The organizational context recommends decisions that elicit social approval and tactics that limit active and widespread opposition. As the objectives of sustaining approval and of gaining legitimation become more important, "safe" issues gain priority over more complex issues. Areas that are perceived as in need of change, but that are also much more readily subject to controversy and opposition, must be managed cautiously and inobtrusively - and, therefore, often incompletely - within established policies and structures. In such constraining settings it is more likely that managers who are striving for success will be responsive to criticisms of inefficient university management. A concern for order, efficiency, and accountability permits managers to anchor themselves in activities that have visible outcomes and to communicate to higher authorities valued improvements. Insecure authority finds an anchor in the improvement of bureaucratic controls.

In settings where past events contributed to ambiguous managerial authority, the traditions of search processes can confound problems. Search criteria typically assure that the chances of candidates are adversely affected by any evidence of conflict in past managerial positions. Evidence of previous popularity is valued." "Abrasive" personalities are approached with caution; they may fare poorly in interviews. More generally, search committees tend to express a preference for candidates whose presentations elicit not only favorable responses but, also, a sense of security among careful listeners.

The organization of search processes communicates to the candidate that he or she must please diverse constituencies. In organizations where authority is precarious, and where faculty members are exceptionally sensitive to its uncautious uses, such constraints can be partially overcome by clear mandates that have been formulated prior to the commencement of a search. But more often than not such mandates are missing. Thus, as the search process unfolds, it fails to promote assumptions and interpretations that could sustain a successful candidate's more controversial objectives. In the absence of mandates, the implicit message is to shape the organization in accordance with traditional symbols of prestige. The process thus sets the stage for self-presentations that provide the potential manager some guarantee for controlling future opposition with supportive

coalitions. It encourages candidates to identify themselves with traditional values, with the work of prestigious institutions, and with all that is abstractly "good" in demands of many different interest groups. In the context of declining resources and of widespread uncertainty about the demands of changing environments, the effective candidate continues to stand for many values: for affirmative action, for improved support services, for the strengthening of departments, for high quality programs, for the strengthening of the liberal arts and the development of applied programs; for greater rewards for teaching, for new approaches to learning, for scholarship and research; for faculty autonomy and strong governance. Many managers thus enter their roles with a background of premature assurances that they will respond to a wide range of interests and that modest change goals will be adapted to established structures and practices.

The training and the work history of university administrators guarantees strong identification with members of the faculty. Most administrators share traditional values with their faculty (Cohen and March, 1974:25). Collegial bords and ambiguous authority combine to heighten responsiveness to faculty members with stature who often are sensitive to incautious uses of authority and quick to defend the prerogatives and autonomy of the faculty. Informal consultations with leading members of the faculty intensify awareness of risks and often also the ambivalence with which changes in traditional practices are

approached. Thus, change objectives may be abandoned or modified to fit into the established structure long before they have received a wider hearing. In less prestigious organizations, moreover, upwardly mobile administrators are often oriented toward a time-limited tenure of office. Sensitive to future career opportunities, they have little to gain from visible conflicts in a world in which "bad news" travels quickly. Prepared for mobility to higher status or to more prestigious institutions, they profit from the avoidance of long-term and controversial change objectives. Long-term objectives have less certain and less visible outcomes than the efficient management of a complex organization, and harmonious relationships to faculty provide better guarantees for success than the time-consuming management of opposition. The conditions that shape managerial careers encourage an emphasis on the management of a stable organization.

With the support of higher authorities, campus managers have centralized their efforts in areas where managerial prerogatives are less readily questioned and where external pressures for "rational management" sustain hierarchical authority. In the name of "exigencies" accountable management can confront members of the organization with mandates sanctioned by external power - be they boards, regents, or legislators. Centralized authority is exercised with less reluctance when budgets are cut, positions diminished, travel funds curtailed, or staff support is reduced.

Rational management defends itself against charges of injustice by guiding implementation with objective criteria: departmental size and student/faculty ratios become standard guides for implementing reductions and redistributions of resources. But while such criteria may sustain beliefs in equity, they hinder allocations for the implementation of more fundamental changes in organizational goals. In periods of retrenchment, allocations by formula are important means for maintaining organizational stability. But when innovations can no longer be achieved by additions to established structures, such bureaucratic practices also inhibit change.

Centralized fiscal controls, no matter how equitably they are imposed, increase alienation and critical reactions to the power of hierarchy. Faculty members are notoriously resentful of centralization of power and readily suspicious of formal managerial methods (Diran, 1978). Typically they suspect that objective managerial accounting is not entirely independent of the more subtle influences of established power and privileges (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974). Thus, while they may feel forced to accept centralized allocations, they are less passive when the detailed consequences of centralized decisions must be negotiated in colleges and schools. Selective centralization of power in areas where the prerogatives of management are sustained by economic realities and higher authority may thus add to pressures to maintain stability and to control the emergence of active

opposition. In the context of precarious authority, two responses deserve attention: 1) Central authority withdraws from exercising controls in areas that involve the substantive issues of college and university-wide development; 2) It accepts, may even encourage, a flexible and participatory approach to college decision-making.

Controls that are primarily defined by the realities of markets and budgets are inadequate for the management of colleges. Decisions that transform disorderly into more orderly, administratively more effective procedures fail to sustain a constructive and cooperative environment. Centralized processes of decision-making thus must be combined with modes of control that are more effective in diffusing alienation and in sustaining creative and voluntary involvement in the affairs of the organization. Such objectives favor a style of management that is compatible with faculty conceptions of their rights in processes of decision-making. The accent fal's on authority responsive to many interests, willing to negotiate, and ready to work within the framework of college governance. As central management withdraws from more direct controls over the development of colleges, the authority of Deans becomes a crucial element in the pursuit of change.

The authority of Deans is strengthened by the "inevitabilities" communicated by central management, by careful sifting and timing of information passed down the hierarchy, and by central

management's cautious avoidance of ideologically charged and divisive goals. Under the best circumstances such cautious and factual management contributes to shared definitions of reality and, therefore, a modicum of consensus on the objective realities that must become premises of decision-making. But objective realities define only some dimensions of decision-making. In more complex, "softer" areas of decision-making, the authority of Deans tends to remain ambiguous. This ambiguity is in part an inevitable outcome of a complex participatory process. But it is also a function of the uncertainties that stem from subtle problems in the relationship between levels of the hierarchy.

When leadership in controversial areas of decision-making is reluctantly exercised, the safety of each managerial level depends at least in part on the ability to withhold financial or other support when political processes make this advisable. Thus, with stability as a major objective, central management's security depends in part on its ability to withhold resources or approval when reactions to college decisions suggest this to be a wise course. Similarly, Deans have to protect themselves in the context of uncertain support from central management; thus they are rarely in a position to give unequivocal support to more demanding or more controversial change in their college. Without explicit central support for the priorities of college development, Deans must remain tentative. Without clear mandates they find it harder to modify standard criteria for resource

allocation, to initiate resource sharing between colleges, or to provide committees with clear parameters for decision-making. Indeed, to protect themselves, Deans may often find it necessary to sustain uncertainties in order to justify delayed changes in support for their college's academic objectives. Deans who opt for more difficult and more controversial areas of development add to the potential of conflict with the faculty the potential of conflict with central administration, and they run the risk of promising more to faculty than they can sustain over time. Tentativeness of commitment is a necessary strategy, and uncertainty may, therefore, pervade the system.

The typically tentative and vague central controls over evolving college development reflects, in part an adaptation to many uncertainties - not only political responses, but also enrollment patterns, future fiscal conditions, faculty participation, for example. Through decentralization the system is expected to generate useful adaptations to a changing environment. But the authority of Deans is rarely sufficient to utilize this decentralized system in ways that permit substantial changes in established practices. Deans' ability to please both faculty and superior authority is a significant factor in career advancement. In some organizations Deans' notoriously precarious authority may have been further complicated by conditions similar to those previously mentioned: past conflicts, frequent successions, unclear mandates. The realistic problems of a

college as much as a Dean's personal ambition may encourage a focus on more fundamental change. But under pressure to preserve the peace, to sustain beliefs in equity, and to avoid being caught in political pressures that pit centralized authority against college authority, most academic Deans will opt for working within the established structure toward modest change objectives. In the absence of unambiguous central support, and often under conditions of reduced resources for the allocation of incentives and rewards, the system promotes excessive reliance on the personal skills of the college manager - his or her ability to persuade and to negotiate modest change.

The conditions under which change in colleges is pursued produce the properties of decision-making that have been described in the literature. The selection of objectives that avoid the impression of major change and that are, therefore, relatively independent of each other, contributes to the maintenance of a "loosely coupled system" (Weick, 1976) with its more moderate demands for control. Without clear and unequivocal central support of change goals and often in the context of uncertain future resource allocations, Deans can cautiously suggest and support some promising directions. Rarely, however, are they in a position to control specific outcomes - for example, the scope of interdisciplinary or inter-college cooperation, the organization of the curriculum, the uses of innovative teaching techniques. Within a general framework,

programs evolve somewhat unpredictably and reflect the compromises of voluntary participants. This flexible approach avoids serious conflict and contributes to a phenomenon that Weick (1983) recently described: vague notions of consensus, followed by only loosely connected activities.

For Deans, no less than for central management, realistic limits on authority shape the quality of decisions. What comes to be valued are decision-processes that are manageable: they are within the limits of known budgets; they require no or only modest reallocation of resources; they propose objectives that can be achieved within limited time-spans; and they are safe since they create few controversies and arouse little or no opposition. (For a similar type of decision-making in public organizations, see Clark and Schrode, 1979). Organizational objectives that divide the college, that polarize the faculty, or that disturb the "live-and-let-live" attitudes of interest groups (Bacharach and Lawler, 1980:79-104) must be avoided. Face-to-face negotiations and personal influence become major managerial tools, and substantial reliance is placed on the lateral integration achieved by committees and individual faculty members intent on pursuing specific objectives. What Bacharach and Lawler (1980:40) term "usurption" (final decision in areas where subordinates claim such a right) is avoided in colleges. Indeed, consultation and committee recommendations may be sought beyond what is dictated by formal governance rules. Deans not

only seek to avoid conflict with their faculty; they also attempt to improve their influence over central administration. Evidence of faculty support strengthens their claims.

STABLE ORGANIZATIONS AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES

Apparently stable and conflict-free universities can conceal many unresolved issues. There are the old issues: the problems of undergraduate teaching and learning; the relative merit that should be assigned to teaching and research; the paucity of cooperative relationships between departments and between colleges; the ineffectiveness of governance; the unclarified missions of urban universities. There are issues more recently discussed: the role of liberal education in the context of changing student priorities; the ineffectiveness of outcome evaluations for departmental and interdepartmental programs; the problems of developmental work that depends on the voluntary contributions of faculty (Mandelbaum, 1983); the inadequacies of the reward and delivery systems for programs adapted to the needs of adult learners, and the need for more cooperative relationships with industry (Lynton, 1983). Many of these issues challenge established values; they also demand for their resolution more complex and controlled changes in structure than

a management intent on avoiding conflict-prone decisions can mobilize. They demand the creation of new commitments and beliefs along with the modification of traditional practices. Such changes cannot be achieved without unequivocal hierarchical support of strategic objectives, determined coordination of programs that involve more than one department or colleges, and unambiguous delegation of authority down the hierarchy. They call for differentiation between essential and marginal activities and, therefore, for more flexible criteria for resource allocation. Changes that can not be achieved without altering established practices and in many instances, therefore, also the current balance of power, inevitably call for the shaping of new coalitions, and the unravelling of old compromises. Such changes cannot be achieved without conflict. They therefore demand more security in the exercise of managerial authority, a more positive view of the functions of conflict, and a greater concern with strategies of conflict containment that are less paralyzing than a one-sided retreat into the management of a stable organization.

The conditions that intensify propensities to avoid controversial decisions promote mechanistic metaphors: the view that the organization can be converted into a smooth-running , efficient, and cost-effective machine. Management that bends heavily in this direction can, over time, build a body of rules and regulations that stabilize the routines of efficient

administration. But by developing a negative orientation toward risk-taking in areas that are not readily managed by objective accounting, by deemphasizing values or by defining them narrowly in terms of past traditions, by neglecting the demands posed by the uniqueness of an organization, management risks the major defaults of leadership: the failure to set goals and to infuse the organizations at all levels with the values and strategies needed to achieve these goals, the tendency to confuse narrowly defined organizational success with more fundamental institutional success (Selznick, 1957:24-28). Leadership that is forced to retreat for its own protection assures that the areas of nondecision-making (Bachrach and Baratz 1963:573-632) widen to the detriment of organizational development. If widespread, such propensities add an additional justification to cautious management: a paucity of tested models for change.

Overly cautious management centralizes selectively and delegates ambivalently. Constraints on hierarchical authority and efforts to forestall conflict in response to its centralized exercise may help to sustain participatory systems within relatively autonomous units on campus. These participatory patterns have attractive features. They encourage a wide range of faculty initiatives within a context of relatively loose controls; the parameters that define committee work often are minimally constraining; the scope left to negotiations among faculty provides ample opportunities for building networks that

correspond to personal interests and shared motivations. Change may be slow but, cumulatively, it may not be insignificant. Yet, the process also suffers from serious deficits.

Participation that is unconstrained by determined leadership can suffer from too much freedom and uncertainty. With limited authority to control college development in areas of uncertain outcome, Deans tend to leave substantial control over development to motivated members of the faculty and to informal faculty networks. Informal ties can accomplish much. But the outcome of such efforts is often uncertain, for some change objectives are anchored too narrowly in established relationships, and more often than not are constrained by faculty obligations to honor and protect established practices and interests.

Cautious management contributes to a less constrained, more autonomous participatory process. But this autonomy also increases uncertainty and, over the long run, it can contribute to disillusionment with the outcomes of participation. It can contribute to resignation when work has no visible outcome and when too many apparently unconnected activities blur a sense of direction. Lack of control over the participatory process contributes to faculty complaints about "wasted efforts" and "committee proliferation," and it is reflected in criticisms of "anarchy."

Continuous faculty involvement guarantees that new or changed

programs will evolve despite uncertainties. But the pace of change may be too slow and the compromises too profound to test new models for learning or teaching. The college system is responsive, but in the absence of consensus on major objectives, its responsiveness is severely limited by its own fiscal and political realities. Or the college level academic work shows the properties stressed by March (1981:563): change is continuous and creative. But one also fears with others (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) that organizational inertia severely limits fundamental changes in traditional practices and the speed with which important innovations should be introduced and tested.

Too much or unilateral emphasis on stability and efficiency hinders the development of a sense of organizational uniqueness and success to which more determined uses of authority can contribute. The college and, ultimately, the whole university may come to be perceived as full of unsolvable problems. Faculty members find it difficult to "make sense" out of diverse changes; serendipity rather than rational choice appears to control emerging activities, and "leadership" comes to be questioned. Inobtrusive management makes the attribution of leadership more difficult. Too much subtleness in decision-making undermines perceptions that administrators are marching one step ahead of the faculty. Moreover, a too cautious and indirect pursuit of administrative objectives can intensify concern with "manipulative" uses of authority; administrators come to be

viewed with suspicion (Baldridge, 1971:66). Distrust can also be intensified by sudden, quite unpredictable, shifts to centralized controls. Indeed, to the extent that too many constraints on authority increase frustration with and intolerance of cumbersome processes of decision-making, fluctuations in modes of control become more likely. Shifts to centralized controls occur whenever conditions suggest that such controls can be exercised without fear of major political or personal consequences. Moreover, in the absence of leadership willing to face (and protected to survive) controversial decisions in complex and uncertain areas of management, more far-reaching changes are more likely during periods of crisis. But crises, even though they may force the search for alternative practices, also make conflict containment more difficult. Indeed, one of the more perplexing problems for a management intent on avoiding major conflicts is the danger that conflicts may intensify by postponing decisions until environmental pressures force their resolution under stress.

There are no easy solutions to practices and relationships that are rooted not only in the traditions of privilege and power of an organization but also in the general properties of our culture. Nor is it a simple matter to address the issue of inadequate authority in the context of still evolving and not always securely rooted faculty governance. Yet the alternatives are equally undesirable. Too many constraints on administrative

power create escapes into bureaucratization; too many controls in the name of efficiency and stability promote unrealistic demands for charismatic leadership, and participatory systems with inadequate constraints can be self-defeating, for their ineffectiveness can become an excuse for less desirable uses of authority.

While dramatic changes may neither be possible nor desirable, the current call for more effective university leadership suggests that the problems of university managers need renewed attention. The preceding discussion suggested some avenues for examining the problems of contemporary university managers and the areas in which specific organizations may discover the sources of undesirable constraints: the nature of search processes; the relationships between hierarchical levels and the conditions under which delegated authority is exercised in colleges; the relationship between change objectives and the nature of participatory processes; the management of finances for facilitating change under conditions of limited growth; the available methods of conflict resolution, for example. Above all, it seems to be important that the positive functions of conflict receive more emphasis, that experimentation and risk-taking be encouraged by higher authorities, and that failure be accepted as an inevitable byproduct of courageous efforts to adapt an organization to rapid social change.

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